The Returns Policy for Perishable Commodities under Fuzzy Demand by Chang, Shu-Hui & [[corresponding]]Chang, Shu-Hui
 
The Returns Policy for Perishable Commodities under Fuzzy Demand 
 
SHU-HUI CHANG∗ 
Department of Business Administration 
Takming University of Science and Technology 
No. 56, Sec. 1, Huanshan Road, Neihu District, Taipei City, 11451 
TAIWAN (ROC) 
shchang@takming.edu.tw 
 
SHIH-HENG PAO   
Department of International Business  
Tamkang University  
No. 151 Yingzhuan Road, Danshui Dist., New Taipei City, 25137 
TAIWAN (ROC) 
psh@mail.tku.edu.tw 
 
JENG-YAN TSAI 
Department of International Business  
Tamkang University  
No. 151 Yingzhuan Road, Danshui Dist., New Taipei City, 25137 
TAIWAN (ROC) 
tsaijy@mail.tku.edu.tw 
 
 
Abstract: This paper studies the effect of the returns policy on channel coordination and Pareto efficiency in a 
two-echelon supply chain with fuzzy demand. As in the traditional probabilistic analysis, we prove 
that the profits for the whole supply chain, the manufacturer and the retailer in the coordination 
situation are larger than the corresponding one in the non- coordination situation. Not like the 
probabilistic analysis, the optimal quantity is not unique in fuzzy demand. The goal of channel 
coordination and Pareto efficiency can be achieved by the returns policy if the optimal quantity is smaller than 
the most possible value of fuzzy demand; otherwise, it may not be achieved. 
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1 Introduction 
If total profits summing up profits of members of 
supply chain do not reach the attainable maximum 
profit of the whole supply chain, then the supply 
chain lacks of efficiency. Literature suggests that 
contract terms such as returns policy may be used to 
coordinate profit distribution among supply chain to 
improve the efficiency of supply chain (Emmons 
and Gilbert, 1980; Pasternack, 1985; Jeuland and 
Shugan, 1983; Weng, 1995). It is well known that 
members of supply chain enter into a contract with 
some certain terms leading to maximization of total 
expected profits of supply chain, then the supply 
chain is called as coordinative one. But only if the 
coordinative contract is also Pareto efficient1 which 
means that if after members of supply chain enters 
into a contract, profits for all members will not 
decrease and profit of at least one member will 
increase, the contract will be accepted by all parties 
and rejected by one party at least otherwise.2 
These researches mentioned above mostly 
discussed the models by using probability 
distribution with known parameters. The method of 
probability distribution is based on the assumption 
that the demand distribution can be inferred from 
sufficient data. However, past data are not always 
available or reliable because of new products and 
market turbulence. The challenges for using 
traditional models are increasing with the change of 
                                                 
1 Varian (1992).  
2 Bose and Anand (2007). 
environment and the fuzzy set theory provides an 
alternative method for dealing with demand 
uncertainty. 
The fuzzy set theory is widely applied in many 
academic areas, 3  for example, inventory problem 
(Chang et al, 2004; Wang, 2011; Vijayan and 
Kumaran, 2008), EOQ model (Roy and Maiti, 1997; 
Yao and Lee, 1999), etc. However, there have been 
a few researches on channel coordination and Pareto 
efficiency under fuzzy demand even how to achieve 
channel coordination and Pareto efficiency 
simultaneously has been the focus of intensive 
research in traditional method by using probability 
distribution.  
In fact, only a few articles have been published 
on the fuzzy inventory problem to discuss channel 
coordination and Pareto efficiency. Xu and Zhai 
(2008) consider a two-stage supply chain 
coordination problem with revenue-sharing policy 
and focuses on the fuzziness aspect of demand 
uncertainty. They prove that the maximum expected 
supply chain profit in a coordination situation is 
greater than the total profit in a non-coordination 
situation and also prove that Pareto efficiency can 
simultaneously occur with coordination. 
Returns policy often occur in practice, but to our 
knowledge, the discussion on channel coordination 
and Pareto efficiency under fuzzy demand is absent 
in the literature. In this paper, we study channel 
coordination and Pareto efficiency of a two-echelon 
                                                 
3 See Sirbiladze et al (2009), Cheng et al (2010), and Lai 
et al (2010). 
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supply chain with fuzzy demand by using the 
returns policy. Just like Xu and Zhai (2008), we also 
adopt triangular fuzzy number to model market 
demand. First, we find the optimal quantity for the 
profit of the whole supply chain in the integrated 
system, then analyze the behavior of both the 
manufacturer and the retailer in a non-coordinated 
situation. Finally, we establish a model in which the 
supply chain is decentralized, and the manufacturer 
adopts the returns policy that allows the retailer to 
return all unsold items at a buyback price per unit, 
but the retailer has to order the quantity which 
maximizes the channel-wide profit. By comparing 
the two situations with or without the returns policy 
in the decentralized supply chain, we conclude that 
the returns policy is channel coordinating and Pareto 
efficient if the optimal quantity is smaller than the 
most possible value of fuzzy demand; but the goal 
of coordination and efficiency could not be achieved 
if the optimal quantity is larger than the most 
possible value of fuzzy demand. 
 
 
2 Preliminaries 
Consider a single-period supply chain problem in 
which the manufacturer produces a product at unit 
cost c, sells the product to the retailer and charges 
the retailer a unit wholesale price w (>c). The 
retailer faces demand from consumers and sells the 
product at the price p(> w ). We assume that the 
wholesale price w  and the retail price p both are 
exogenously given. The demand is subjectively 
believed to be a normal fuzzy number A~  described 
by a general membership function 
A~μ  
 
σ
σ )( −− mx , if  mxm ≤<−σ  
=)(~ xAμ   σ
σ xm −+ )( ,   if    σ+≤< mxm  
0                    otherwise 
where m is the most possible value of fuzzy number 
A~ , and σ  is the spread of A~ . We denote it as =A~  
),( σm . Figure 1 is a general membership function 
for the demand A~ . 
 
)(~ xAμ  
1 
 
 
 
 
0                                                                x  
σ−m        m        σ+m  
Figure 1. The membership function of A~  
 
It can easily be shown that the λ -level set of A~ , 
defined as })(|{ ~ λμλ ≥= xxA A is a closed bounded 
interval for 10 ≤≤ λ , and can be denoted as 
])1(,)1([ βλαλλ −−−+= mmA . 
For linear operations of closed interval, by 
classical extension principle (Luo, 1984) , we have 
the following conclusions: 
(1) ],[],[],[ dbcadcba ++=+ ; 
(2) ],[],[],[ cbdadcba −−=− ; 
(3) ],[],[ baba ααα =  if 0≥α , R∈α  and 
(4) ],[],[ abba ααα =  if 0<α , R∈α . 
In order to measure the mean value of a fuzzy 
number A~ , we use the fuzzy mean introduced by 
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Dubois and Prade (1987) 
λλλ daaAE ∫
+
=
1
0
21
2
)()()~( ,                           (1) 
where )](),([ 21 λλ aa  is the λ -level set of A
~ . 
 
 
3 The Basic Model 
We first consider a single-period model for a 
supply chain in which the manufacturer and the 
retailer are independent to each other. That is, each 
member in the supply chain aims to maximize his 
own profit. In this scenario, the manufacturer‘s 
profit is  
DDD
M QcwQ )()(~ −=π ,                             
and the retailer’s profit is 
}~,0max{}~,min{)(~ DDDDR QAsAQpQ −−=π  
DwQ− .                                       (2) 
where the superscript D represents the decentralized 
supply chain. Without doubt, the retailer’s profit is a 
fuzzy set. Since )(~ DDR Qπ  is a fuzzy number, we 
cannot directly maximize it. Therefore we first have 
to transform )(~ DDR Qπ  into ))(~(
DD
R QE π  by using 
the fuzzy number’s probabilistic mean as defined by 
Eq. (1), and then maximize ))(~( DDR QE π .We 
discuss this optimal problem by the following two 
cases. 
 
(1).Case 1: mQm <≤−σ  
According to the operation properties of 
triangular fuzzy numbers, we have the following 
expressions about the k-level sets of fuzzy sales 
volume and goodwill loss quantity: 
 
 
],)1([ DQm σλ −+ ,  
if 00 y≤< λ ; 
=λ})
~,(min{ AQ D  
],[ DD QQ , if 10 ≤< λy . 
])1(,0[ σλ −−− DQm ,  
if 00 y≤< λ ; 
=− λ})
~,0(max{ DQA  
,)1([ σλ −+− DQm  
])1( σλ −−− DQm , 
if 10 ≤< λy  
where σ/)(10 mQy
D −+= . It follows that the 
λ -level sets of )(~ DDR Qπ  are 
=λπ ))(~(
DD
R Q  
])(,))(1()()[( DD QwpspQwsmsp −+−+−+− σλ
,if  00 y≤< λ ; and 
=λπ ))(~(
DD
R Q  
σλ ssmQwsp D )1()[( −+−−+ , 
])1()( σλ ssmQwsp D −−−−+ ,if 10 ≤< λy . 
According to Eq. (1), the probabilistic mean of a 
retailer’s profit is given by 
=λπ ))(~(
DD
R QE  
)]()2()[(
2
1 mQQwspmsp DD −+−++− σ
σ
 
]))[((
4
1 22 σ
σ
−−++ mQsp D  
)]()[(1 DD QmsmQwsp −−−++
σ
.     
We can determine the profit-maximizing quantity 
by setting 0/))(~( =DDDR dQQdE λπ  since the 
second-order condition =22 /))(~( DDDR dQQEd λπ  
02/)( <+− σsp  and solving the profit-maximizing 
quantity *DlQ  as 
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σ
sp
wspmQ Dl +
−+
+=
2* ,                          (3) 
where wsp 2<+ , and the corresponding 
maximum probabilistic mean profit for the retailer 
and the manufacturer are 
σπ
sp
wspwmwpQE Dl
D
R +
−+
−−=
)()())(~( * .  (4) 
])2()[())(~( * σπ
sp
wspmcwQE Dl
D
M +
−+
+−= . 
The profit for the whole supply chain is equal to the 
sum of ))(~( QE DMπ  and ))(~( QE
D
Rπ . That’s, 
=Π ))(~( *Dl
D QE ))(~( *Dl
D
M QE π ))(~(
*D
l
D
R QE π+ , 
where ))(~( *Dl
D QE Π  denotes the profit for the 
whole supply chain in the decentralized chain 
without returns policy (i.e., 0=u ) and mQ Dl <
* , 
and 
=Π ))(~( *Dl
D QE  
σ
sp
wspcwmcp
+
−++
−−
)2()(
2
.(5) 
where wsp 2<+ . 
 
(2). Case 2. σ+≤≤ mQm  
Similar to the discussion in case 1, the λ -level 
sets of fuzzy sales volume and goodwill loss 
quantity can be respectively expressed as 
],)1([ Qm σλ −+ , if 10 y≤< λ ; 
=λ})
~,(min{ AQ  
])1(,)1([ σλσλ −−−+ mm , if 
11 ≤< λy . 
])1(,0[ σλ −−− DQm , 
=− λ})
~,0(max{ DQA           if  10 y≤< λ ; 
 
]0,0[ , if 11 ≤< λy . 
where σ/)(11 mQy
D −−= . Similarly, the 
λ -level sets of )(~ DDR Qπ  are 
=λπ ))(~(
DD
R Q  
),()1()()[( spQcsmsp D +−+−+− σλ  
])( DQcp − , if 10 y≤< λ ; and  
=λπ ))(~(
DD
R Q  
])1(,)1([ pcQpmpcQpm DD −−−−+− λσλσ  
, if  10 y≤< λ . 
According to Eq. (1), the probabilistic mean of a 
retailer’s profit is given by 
mspQE DDR )[(2
1))(~( −=
σ
π  
)]()2( DD QmQcsp −+−++ σ  
]))[((
4
1 22 σ
σ
−−++ mQsp D  
)]([1 mQcQpm DD −−+
σ
.       
Differentiating ))(~( DDR QE π  with respect to 
DQ , 
the first-order condition is 
=D
DD
R
dQ
QdE ))(~(π
 
σ
σ
)2[(
2
1 csp −+ 0)])(( =−++ Qmsp . 
We can determine the optimal order quantity is 
σ
sp
wspmQ Dr +
−+
+=
2* ,                           (6) 
where wsp 2≥+ . The second-order condition is 
satisfied. and the corresponding maximum 
probabilistic mean profit for the retailer and the 
manufacturer are 
σπ
sp
wspwmwpQE Dr
D
R +
−+
−−=
)()())(~( * .  (7) 
])2()[())(~( * σπ
sp
wspmcwQE Dl
D
M +
−+
+−=  
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The profit for the whole supply chain in the case is 
=Π ))(~( *Dr
D QE  
σ
sp
wspcwmcp
+
−++
−−
)2()(
2
.  (8) 
where wsp 2≥+ . 
There is one thing worth noting. The two optimal 
order quantity in Eqs. (3) and (6) look alike, but in 
fact they are different since wsp 2<+  for 
*D
lQ and wsp 2≥+  for 
*D
rQ . In other words, 
<*DlQ
*D
rQ . 
Subsequently, we consider the situation in which 
the manufacturer acts as his own retailer. Hence, the 
profit ( IΠ~ ) is  
IIIII cQQAsAQpQ −−−=Π }~,0max{}~,min{)(~
.                                                                             (9) 
where the superscript I represents the integrated 
supply chain. 
)(~ II QΠ  is also a fuzzy number, and we can not 
directly maximize it. Similarly, we have to 
transform )(~ II QΠ  into ))(~( II QE Π by Eq. (1), 
and then maximize ))(~( II QE Π . In this situation, 
the optimal quantity is produced or ordered based on 
maximizing the chain-wide profit, not like *DiQ  ( 
rli ,= ) maximizing the retailer’s profit. Since 
compared to Eq. (2), the only difference of Eq. (9) is 
the unit cost, hence, it is easy to derive the optimal 
quantity for the whole supply chain by replacing w  
in Eqs. (3) and (6) with c . That is,  
σ
sp
cspmQ Ii +
−+
+=
2* , rli ,= ,             (10) 
where csp 2≥+  if σ+≤≤ mQm Il
* ; 
and csp 2<+  if mQm Ir <≤−
*σ . 
The corresponding optimal profit for the whole 
channel in this model is 
=Π ))(~( *Ii
I QE σ
sp
cspcmcp
+
−+
−−
)()( , rli ,= .      
(11) 
From Eqs.(3) (or (6)) and (10), we obtain 
−*IiQ 0
)(2* >
+
−
=
sp
cwQ Di
σ
, rli ,= . 
The optimal quantity in the decentralized system is 
smaller than that in the integrated system. This is the 
so-called “double-marginalization effect” which 
arises from the conflict of the profits between the 
manufacturer and the retailer (Spengler, 1950;. Ding 
and Chen, 2008). 
Next, from Eqs.(5) (or (8)) and (11), we derive 
))(~( *Ii
I QE Π =Π− ))(~( *Di
D QE 0)(
2
>
+
− σ
sp
cw
,
rli ,= . 
The above result is obvious since the profit of a 
vertically integrated firm is the maximum attainable 
in the supply chain. If the total profits summing up 
profits of members of supply chain do not reach the  
maximum attainable profit of the whole supply 
chain, then such supply chain lacks of efficiency. 
That is to say, the manufacturer and the retailer do 
not reach their respective maximum at the same 
time in the decentralized supply chain. 
 
 
4 Returns Policy 
In order to improve the efficiency of the whole 
supply chain, we now turn to consider the situation 
in which both players are willing to cooperate to get 
their optimal joint profit. In this situation, the 
retailer orders the quantity *IiQ ( rli ,= ), and the 
manufacturer promise to buy back all unsold items 
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by paying the retailer a buyback price u at the end of 
the selling season. If  wu = , the returns policy is 
with a full refund; if wu < , then, the returns policy 
is with a partial refund. In the scenario, the profits 
for the manufacturer and the retailer are as follows, 
respectively, 
}~,0max{)(),(~ *** AQuQcwQu Ii
I
i
I
i
P
M −−−=π , 
}~,0max{}~,min{),(~ *** AQuAQpQu Ii
I
i
I
i
P
R −+=π  
**}~,0max{ Ii
I
i wQQAs −−− . 
where the superscript P represents the supply chain 
with the returns policy. ),,(~ *Ii
P
R Quwπ   is a fuzzy 
number like )(~ DDR Qπ . Similar to the precedent, we 
discuss the expressions of }~,min{ * AQ Ii , 
}~,0max{ * AQ Ii − and }
~,0max{ *IiQA − by the 
following two cases. 
 
(1).Case 1: mQm <≤−σ  
],)1([ *IiQm σλ −+ , if 
*
00 y≤< λ ; 
=λ})
~,(min{ * AQ Il  
 
],[ ** Il
I
l QQ , if 1*0 ≤< λy . 
])1(,0[ * σλ −−− mQ Il , 
                                                 if *00 y≤< λ ; 
=− λ})
~,0(max{ * AQ Il  
 
]0,0[ , if 1*0 ≤< λy . 
 
 
 
 
])1(,0[ * σλ −−− IlQm , 
if *00 y≤< λ ; 
=− λ})
~,0(max{ *IlQA  
,)1([ * σλ −+− IlQm  
])1(* σλ −−− IlQm , 
if 1*0 ≤< λy . 
where σ/)(1 **0 mQy
I
l −+= . We can determine 
that the λ -level sets of  ),(~ *Il
P
R Quπ  are 
=),(~ *Il
P
R Quπ  
,)()1)(()[( *IlQwsspmsp −+−++− σλ  
])1()( * σλ −−−−+ uumQwup Il  if *00 y≤< λ ; 
=),(~ *Il
P
R Quπ  
,)1()[( * σλ −+−−+ ssmQwsp Il  
])1()( * σλ −−−−+ ssmQwsp Il  if 1*0 ≤< λy . 
According to Eq. (1) and *IlQ  defined in 
Eq.(10), the probabilistic mean of a retailer’s profit 
in this situation is given by 
=)),(~( *Il
P
R QuE π mwp )( −  
σ)2)((
sp
cspwsp
+
−+
−++  
)( sup +−− σ2)(
sp
csp
+
−+
. (12) 
In order to entice the retailer to increase his 
stocking level from *DiQ  to 
*I
iQ  ( rli ,= ), the 
manufacturer has to ensure that the retailer’s profit 
is at least the profit without returns policy. That is, 
−)),(~( *Ii
P
R QuE π 0))(~(
* ≥Di
D
R QE π .       (13) 
This is the retailer participation constraint (Lau and 
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Lau, 1999; Tsay, 2001). Let Eq.(13) equal zero and 
set ,li =  so the retailer’s profit with returns policy 
is equal to its counterpart without returns policy: 
−)),(~( *Il
P
R QuE π 0))(~(
* =Dl
D
R QE π . 
From the above equation, we obtain the following 
condition: 
0
)(
))((
2
2
>
−+
−+
=
csp
cwspul .                      (14) 
If the buyback price is set according to Eq.(14), 
then we can find that the manufacturer is strictly 
better off with the returns policy than without it, and 
neither of the parties is worse off, the returns policy 
is Pareto-efficient with respect to the contract 
without the returns policy between the manufacturer 
and the retailer in the decentralized supply chain. 
And it is found that the joint profit )),(~( *Il
P QuE Π  
+= )),(~(( *Il
P
R QuE π ))),(~(
*I
l
P
M QuE π  is  
maximized in the supply chain. Therefore, channel 
coordination will occur alongside Pareto-efficiency 
if Eq.(14) is satisfied. 
 
Proposition 1.  If the optimal quantity is smaller 
than the most possible value of fuzzy demand ( m ), 
and if the returns policy is implemented according 
to Eq.(14), then the supply chain achieves the goal 
of channel coordination and Pareto efficiency. 
 
Now we assume wul = . If wul = , from (14), 
we derive 
0)( 2 =−+ cspw . 
This is a contradiction since csp >+ )(  and cw > . 
 
Proposition 2. A policy which allows for unlimited 
return at full refund can not achieves the goal of 
channel coordination and Pareto efficiency. 
 
The result in Proposition 2 is similar to the 
Theorem 1 of Pasternack (1985), which neglects the 
discussion on Pareto efficiency. It is obvious that, if 
the manufacturer does not allow the retailer to make 
any returns at all, it is impossible to achieve channel 
coordination and Pareto efficiency. If 0=lu , from 
(14), we derive 
0
)(
))((
2
2
=
−+
−+
csp
cwsp
. 
This is also a contradiction since  cw >  and 
csp >+ )( . 
Differentiating Eq.(14) with respect to w, p, s, and 
c, respectively, then we determine the following 
conditions: 
0
)(
))((2
2 >−+
−+
=
csp
cwsp
dw
du
; 
0
)(
))((
3
2
<
−+
−++−
==
csp
cwcsp
ds
du
dp
du
; 
0
)(
))()((2
3 <−+
−+−+−
=
csp
cwspwsp
dc
du
. 
From the results mentioned above, we conclude that 
u is an increasing function of w and a decreasing 
function of p, s, and c. 
 
Proposition 3. To maintain Pareto efficiency and 
channel coordination, the larger the wholesale price, 
the larger the buyback price will be; but the larger 
the retail price, the goodwill loss, and the unit cost, 
the smaller the buyback price will be. 
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Finally, we discuss the effect of the most possible 
value of fuzzy demand (m) and the spread of fuzzy 
demand (σ ) on the buyback price (u). 
It is easy to find that u has nothing to do with m 
and σ  from Eq.(14) since 0// == σddudmdu . 
In other words, the buyback price is not affected by 
the change of the most possible value and the spread 
of fuzzy demand in order to keep the existence of 
channel coordination and Pareto efficiency. 
 
Proposition 4. The buyback price is independent to 
the most possible value and the spread of fuzzy 
demand in order to achieve the goal of channel 
coordination and Pareto efficiency. 
 
(2). Case 2. σ+≤≤ mQm  
],)1([ *IrQm σλ −+ , if 
*
10 y≤< λ ; 
=λ})
~,(min{ * AQ Ir  
])1(,)1([ σλσλ −−−+ mm , 
if 1*1 ≤< λy . 
])1(,0[ * σλ −−− mQ Ir , 
if *10 y≤< λ ; 
=− λ})
~,0(max{ * AQ Ir  
,)1([ * σλ −+− mQ Ir  
])1(* σλ −−− mQ Ir , 
if 1*1 ≤< λy . 
])1(,0[ * σλ −−− IrQm , 
=− λ})
~,0(max{ *IrQA           if *10 y≤< λ ; 
 
]0,0[ , if 1*1 ≤< λy . 
where σ/)(1 **1 mQy
I
r −−= . We can determine 
that the λ -level sets of  ),(~ *Ir
P
R Quπ  are 
=),(~ *Ir
P
R Quπ  
,)()1)(()[( *IrQwsspmsp −+−++− σλ  
])1()( * σλ −−−−+ uumQwup Ir , if *10 y≤< λ ; 
=),(~ *Ir
P
R Quπ  
,)()1)(()[( *IrQwuupmup −+−++− σλ  
])()1)(()( *IrQwuupmup −+−+−− σλ , if 
1*1 ≤< λy . 
According to Eq. (1) and *IrQ  defined in 
Eq.(10), the probabilistic mean of a retailer’s profit 
in this situation is given by 
=)),(~( *Ir
P
R QuE π mwp )( −  
σ)( uw−− 2)(
sp
csp
+
−+
. 
By means of the similar procedure to case 1, we set 
−)),(~( *Ir
P
R QuE π 0))(~(
* =Dl
D
R QE π . 
From the above equation, we obtain the 
following condition: 
0)(
)(
)])2)([(
2
2
≤>
−+
+−+
=
csp
ccwspwur , if 
])(2[)()( cspcspw −+≤>+ .                   (15) 
Therefore, it is impossible to induce the retailer 
to increase his stocking level from *DrQ  to 
*I
rQ  
by adopting the returns policy only if ≤+ )( spw  
])(2[ cspc −+ . 
If cw 2> , then 0>ru . It occurs in the case 
that the optimal order quantity is larger than the 
most possible value of fuzzy demand. Since cw 2>  
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and csp 2>+ , 4  the difference between sp +  
and w  could be not large enough which means that 
the benefit from selling an extra unit of product 
could be equivalent or the difference is not big. 
Therefore, the manufacturer is willing to adopt the 
returns policy; otherwise, the manufacturer may 
have no intension to implement the returns policy if 
cw 2<  and csp 2>+ . Hence, the sign of ru  in 
Eq.(15) is ambiguous if cw 2< . 
 
Proposition 5.  If the optimal quantity is larger 
than the most possible value of fuzzy demand 
( m ) and if ])(2[)( cspcspw −+>+ , the 
supply chain achieves the goal of channel 
coordination and Pareto efficiency if the 
returns policy is implemented according to 
Eq.(15); otherwise, the goal can not be 
achieved by using the returns policy if 
≤+ )( spw ])(2[ cspc −+ . 
 
If  ])(2[)( cspcspw −+>+ , then it is easy to 
examine that Proposition 2, 3 and 4 can be applied 
in case 2, omitting them. 
 
 
5 Numerical Example 
Assume that the product discussed in the paper 
has a limited shelf life because of either product 
obsolescence or physical decay and its salvage value 
is zero. 
The retail price would be $40, and the wholesale 
price is $30. The goodwill cost per unit due to 
                                                 
4 If  p+s=2c, w>2c is impossible. 
stockout would be $5 and the unit cost for the 
product is $25. Assume that the retailer feels that the 
demand in the selling season will most likely be 
5000 units; not less than 3380 units not more than 
6620 units. Therefore, the fuzzy demand =)(~ QA  
(5000,1620) and the parameters are =),,,( cswp  
(40,30,5,25). 
In the centralized supply chain, the optimal 
quantity is 
000,5820,42* =<=
+
−+
+= m
sp
cspmQ Il σ ; 
and the profit for the whole supply chain is 
=Π ))(~( *Il
I QE
000,57$)()( =
+
−+
−− σ
sp
cspcmcp . 
But when the manufacturer and the retailer take 
action independently, who aim to maximize their 
individual profit, in other words, in the non-
coordinated situation, the optimal quantity, the 
profits for the manufacturer, the retailer and the 
whole supply chain are, respectively, 
000,5460,42* =<=
+
−+
+= m
sp
wspmQ Dl σ ; 
σπ
sp
wspwmwpQE Dl
D
R +
−+
−−=
)()())(~( *  
800,33$=  
])2()[())(~( * σπ
sp
wspmcwQE Dl
D
M +
−+
+−=  
300,22$= . 
100,56$))(~( * =Π Dr
D QE . 
From the above calculation, we obtain that the 
whole supply chain gets 900 more profit in the 
coordinated situation (i.e., the centralized supply 
chain) than that in the non-coordinated situation. 
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In order to improve the efficiency of the whole 
supply chain, both parties are willing to cooperate 
by the returns policy with the buyback price 
16/45=lu  (from Eq. (14)). In this situation,  
800,33$)),
16
45(~( * == Il
P
R QuE π ; 
200,23$)),
16
45(~( * == Il
P
M QuE π ; 
000,57$)),
16
45(~( * ==Π Il
P QuE . 
Since ))(~()),
16
45(~( ** Dl
D
R
I
l
P
R QEQuE ππ == , 
))(~()),
16
45(~( *** Dl
D
M
I
l
P
M QEQuE ππ >=  and 
))(~()),
16
45(~( ** Dl
DI
l
P QEQuE Π==Π , thus, the 
goal of channel coordination and Pareto efficiency 
can be achieved by the returns policy if the optimal 
quantity which maximizes the joint profit is smaller 
than the most possible value of fuzzy demand.  
Keep the others fixed, but the retail price is 
increased to 76. Notice that p+s=81>2c=50, and 
p+s=81>2w=60, and w=30<2c=50 now. In this 
situation, the corresponding values in the centralized 
and the non-coordinated supply chain are as 
follows.  
000,5620,5* =>= mQ Ir ; 
000,227$))(~( * =Π Il
I QE . 
620,5420,5000,5 ** =<=<= Ir
D
r QQm ; 
400,199$))(~( * =Dl
D
R QE π ; 
100,27$))(~( * =Dl
D
M QE π ; 
500,226$))(~( * =Π Dr
D QE . 
In order to keep ))(~()),(~( ** Dr
D
R
I
r
P
R QEQuE ππ = , 
from Eq.(15) the buyback price is 
25.9$
)(
)])2)([(
2
2
−=
−+
+−+
=
csp
ccwspwur . 
It is impossible for the retailer to accept the 
contract in which he has to pay the manufacturer 
$9.25 per unit when he returns unsold items to the 
manufacturer. 
Therefore, when the optimal quantity is larger 
than the most possible value of fuzzy demand, the 
goal of Pareto efficiency and channel coordination 
can not be achieved through the returns policy if 
≤+ )( spw ])(2[ cspc −+ . 
 
 
6 Conclusion 
The returns policy is widely studied in the 
literature to discuss the effect of the policy on 
channel coordination. In this paper, we study 
channel coordination and Pareto efficiency of a 
two-echelon supply chain with demand 
uncertainty which is expressed by fuzzy 
demand rather than probabilistic demand 
inferred by the past record, using the returns 
policy. But realistically, it is not always possible 
for the retailer to gather enough data recorded in the 
past. In fact, external demand is often estimated 
by the retailer’s experience. So it should be 
necessary to use fuzzy set theory to solve the 
uncertainty (Xu and Zhai, 2008).  
When the demand is a trapezoidal fuzzy number, 
the optimal quantity is not necessarily unique like 
the probabilistic demand. The returns policy is a 
risk-sharing mechanism. 5  The larger the order 
                                                 
5 Padmanabhan and Png (1997) do not agree with the 
opinion. 
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quantity, the larger the risk faced by firms due to 
unsold items at the end of the selling season will be. 
When the optimal order quantity is smaller than the 
most possible value of fuzzy demand, the returns 
policy is channel coordinating and Pareto-efficient 
for appropriately chosen value of the problem 
parameters. If all others equal but the retail price 
increases to make that the optimal order quantity is 
larger than the most possible value of fuzzy demand, 
then, the manufacturer may have no intension to 
implement the returns policy unless the retailer is 
willing to accept the negative buyback price. 
Although the increase in the retail price makes 
both parties in the supply chain, it is not certain for 
the manufacturer to encourage the retailer to 
increase his stocking level to the quantity 
maximizing the profit of the whole supply chain if 
the optimal quantity is larger than the most possible 
value of fuzzy demand. 
 
 
References: 
[1] Bose, I. and P. Anand , “On returns policies 
with exogenous price”, European Journal of 
Operational Research, Vol. 178, 2007, pp. 
782-788. 
[2] Chang, H.-C., J.-S. Yao and L.-Y. Ouyang, 
“Fuzzy mixture inventory model with variable 
lead-time based on probabilistic fuzzy set and 
triangular fuzzy number”, Mathematical and 
Computer Modelling, Vol. 39, 2004, pp. 287-
304. 
[3] Cheng, F.-T., H.-S. Chang and S. W. Chiu, 
“Economic production quantity model with 
backordering, rework and machine failure 
taking place in stock piling time”, WSEAS 
Transactions on Information Science and 
Applications, Vol. 7, Issue 4, 2010, pp. 463-
473. 
[4] Ding, D. and J. Chen, J., “Coordinating a three- 
level supply chain with flexible return policies”, 
Omega, Vol.36, 2008, pp. 865-876. 
[5] Dubois, D., and H. Prade, The mean value of a 
fuzzy number, Fuzzy Sets and Systems, 24, 
1987, pp. 279-300. 
[6] Emmons, H. and S. M. Gilbert, “Note: The role 
of returns policies in pricing and inventory 
decisions for catalogue goods”, Management 
Science, Vol. 44, 1998, pp. 276-283. 
[7] Jeuland, A. and S. Shugan, “Managing channel 
profits”, Marketing Science, Vol. 2, No. 3, 
1983, pp. 239-272. 
[8] Lai, T.-Y. and G.-H. Hwang, “Application of 
half-life theory and fuzzy theory to a selection 
and recommendation system for web 
advertisement delivery in consideration of the 
time effect”, WSEAS Transactions on 
Information Science and Applications, Vol. 7, 
Issue 4, 2010, pp.70-80. 
[9] Lau, H.-S., and A. H.-L. Lau, “Manufacturer’s 
pricing strategy and return policy for a single 
period commodity”, European Journal of 
Operational Research, 116, 1999, pp. 233-268. 
[10] Luo, C., “Extension principle and fuzzy 
number”, Fuzzy Mathematics, Vol. 4, 1984, pp. 
107-116. 
[11] Padmanabhan, V. and I. P. L. Png, 
“Manufacturer’s  returns policies and retail 
competition”, Marketing Science, Vol. 16, No. 
1, 1997, pp. 81-94. 
[12] Pasternack, B. A., “Optimal pricing and return 
policies for perishable commodities”, 
WSEAS TRANSACTIONS on 
INFORMATION SCIENCE and APPLICATIONS Shu-Hui Chang, Shih-Heng Pao, Jeng-Yan Tsai
ISSN: 1790-0832 475 Issue 12, Volume 8, December 2011
 
Marketing Science, Vol.4, No.2, 1985, pp. 166-
176. 
[13] Roy, T. K. and M. Maiti, “A fuzzy EOQ model 
with demand-dependent unit cost under limited 
storage capacity”, European Journal of 
Operational Research, Vol. 99, 1997, pp. 425-
432. 
[14] Sirbiladze, G., B. Ghvaberidze, A. Sikharulidze, 
B. Matsaberidze and D. Devadze, “Fuzzy 
covering and partitioning problems based on 
the expert valuations: application in optimal 
choice of candidates”, WSEAS Transactions on 
Information Science and Applications, Vol. 6, 
Issue 11, 2009, pp. 1840-1849. 
[15] Spengler, J., “Vertical integration and antitrust 
policy”,  Journal of Political Economy, Vol.58, 
No.4, 1950, pp. 347-352. 
[16] Tsay, A. A., “Managing retail channel 
overstock: Markdown money and return 
policies”, Journal of Retailing, 77, 2001, pp. 
457-492. 
[17] Varian, H. R., Microeconomic Analysis, 3rd 
edition. W. W. Norton & Company, New York, 
1992. 
[18] Vijayan, T. and M. Kumaran, “Inventory model 
with a mixture of backorders and lost sales 
under fuzzy cost”, European Journal of 
Operational Research, 189, 2008, pp. 105-119. 
[19] Wang, X., “Continuous review inventory 
model with variable lead time in a fuzzy 
random environment”, Expert systems with 
applications, 38, 2011, 11715-11721. 
[20] Weng, Z., “Channel coordination and quantity 
discounts”, Management Science, Vol. 41, No. 
9, 1995, pp.1509-1522. 
[21]  Xu, R. and X. Zhai, “Optimal models for 
single-period supply chain problems with fuzzy 
demand”, Information Sciences, 178, 2008, 
pp.3374-3381. 
[22] Yao, J. S. and H. M. Lee, “Fuzzy inventory 
with or without backorder for fuzzy order 
quantity with trapezoidal fuzzy number”, Fuzzy 
sets and Systems, 105, 1999, pp. 311-337. 
 
WSEAS TRANSACTIONS on 
INFORMATION SCIENCE and APPLICATIONS Shu-Hui Chang, Shih-Heng Pao, Jeng-Yan Tsai
ISSN: 1790-0832 476 Issue 12, Volume 8, December 2011
